Grief, Disorientation, and Futurity Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 22(4), 991–1010 (2023) · Open Access
This paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation, irrespective of the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger's phenomenology, I argue that it is a core characteristic of the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into a specific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible.
Transformation through Dialogue: Gadamer and the Phenomenology of Impaired Intersubjectivity in Depression In Robyn Bluhm & Şerife Tekin (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.
This chapter sketches a phenomenological account of altered intersubjectivity in depression. Depression, I propose, can be framed as a 'dialogical' illness insofar as it fundamentally alters the way one relates to other people and the presupposed shared background. I therefore argue that depression entails what I call an altered 'experience of the Other'. To understand how depression alters the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I draw on Gadamer's phenomenology of understanding via the fusion of horizons, thus on his emphasis on transformation through dialogue.
Possibility of Hermeneutic Conversation and Ethics Theoria and Praxis, 4(1), 16–31 (2016)
In this paper, I aim to defend Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics against what I call the radical hermeneutic critique, specifically the critique developed in Robert Bernasconi's "'You Don't Know What I'm Talking About': Alterity and the Hermeneutic Ideal" (1995). Key to this critique is the claim that Gadamer's account does not rise to the ethical task of embracing the alterity of the Other, but instead reduces it to a projection of one's self. In contrast, I argue that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can accommodate an Other that is not assimilated but appreciated, on the condition that the unique status of a dialogue with the Other as a person is truly distinguished from a dialogue with the Other as a text.
Social Disorientation: A (Critical) Phenomenological Study Doctoral thesis, University of Essex, 2024 · Repository
Drawing on resources in phenomenology, social philosophy, philosophy of emotions, and philosophy of agency, this thesis examines what it is like first-personally to experience metaphorical disorientation in navigating social space. Despite the heterogeneous nature of such experiences, I argue that there is a unifying phenomenological structure underlying paradigmatic cases – what I call "social disorientation" – consisting in a constitutive relationship between feeling not at home and perceived lack of agency over one's personal future. In developing and defending this category, the thesis contributes not only to the scholarship on disorientation, but also to current debates in social philosophy, specifically concerning the relationship between agency and marginalisation. Central to this contribution is the argument that social disorientation is a deficient social relation: the failure to orientate is located not in the individual, but exclusively in interpersonal and social relations that obstruct a person's capacity for self-realisation.
A paper on the critical potential of disorientation (under review)
This paper examines what is required to establish disorientation as a critical category of social experience. I argue that two influential philosophical accounts fail in this task because both model metaphorical disorientation on its literal counterpart, rendering the concept analytically unstable and critically inert. I conclude by reflecting on the conceptual and political stakes of moving beyond such strategies.
A paper on disorientation, anticipation, and social powerlessness (under review)
This paper challenges the assumption that disorientation arises from uncertainty about how to go on, by examining cases in which disorientation emerges from certainty – cases especially common for members of marginalised social groups. I argue that these cases reveal a core phenomenological structure underlying disorientation: a perceived lack of agency over one's personal future that takes a distinctively social form.
A paper on the relation between negative social experiences and social critique
A paper on powerlessness as a central concept for political phenomenology
Grief, Disorientation, and Futurity Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 22(4), 991–1010 (2023) · Open Access
This paper seeks to develop a phenomenological account of the disorientation of grief, specifically the relationship between disorientation and the breakdown in practical self-understanding at the heart of grief. I argue that this breakdown cannot be sufficiently understood as a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space that leaves the bereaved individual at a loss as to how to go on. Examining the experience of losing a loved person and a loved person-to-be, I instead propose that this breakdown should be understood primarily in relation to a distinctive kind of futurity operative in disorientation, irrespective of the extent to which there is a breakdown of formerly shared practices and habitual patterns of navigating lived-in space. Drawing on the resources afforded by Heidegger's phenomenology, I argue that it is a core characteristic of the experience of disorientation in grief that the grieving person can no longer meaningfully press ahead into a specific futural self. This view comes with certain advantages over existing accounts of the temporality of grief for making sense of the disorientated relationship to futurity, which the appeal to Heideggerian resources makes possible.
Transformation through Dialogue: Gadamer and the Phenomenology of Impaired Intersubjectivity in Depression In Robyn Bluhm & Şerife Tekin (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.
This chapter sketches a phenomenological account of altered intersubjectivity in depression. Depression, I propose, can be framed as a 'dialogical' illness insofar as it fundamentally alters the way one relates to other people and the presupposed shared background. I therefore argue that depression entails what I call an altered 'experience of the Other'. To understand how depression alters the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I draw on Gadamer's phenomenology of understanding via the fusion of horizons, thus on his emphasis on transformation through dialogue.
Possibility of Hermeneutic Conversation and Ethics Theoria and Praxis, 4(1), 16–31 (2016)
In this paper, I aim to defend Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics against what I call the radical hermeneutic critique, specifically the critique developed in Robert Bernasconi's "'You Don't Know What I'm Talking About': Alterity and the Hermeneutic Ideal" (1995). Key to this critique is the claim that Gadamer's account does not rise to the ethical task of embracing the alterity of the Other, but instead reduces it to a projection of one's self. In contrast, I argue that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can accommodate an Other that is not assimilated but appreciated, on the condition that the unique status of a dialogue with the Other as a person is truly distinguished from a dialogue with the Other as a text.
Social Disorientation: A (Critical) Phenomenological Study Doctoral thesis, University of Essex, 2024 · Repository
Drawing on resources in phenomenology, social philosophy, philosophy of emotions, and philosophy of agency, this thesis examines what it is like first-personally to experience metaphorical disorientation in navigating social space. Despite the heterogeneous nature of such experiences, I argue that there is a unifying phenomenological structure underlying paradigmatic cases – what I call "social disorientation" – consisting in a constitutive relationship between feeling not at home and perceived lack of agency over one's personal future. In developing and defending this category, the thesis contributes not only to the scholarship on disorientation, but also to current debates in social philosophy, specifically concerning the relationship between agency and marginalisation. Central to this contribution is the argument that social disorientation is a deficient social relation: the failure to orientate is located not in the individual, but exclusively in interpersonal and social relations that obstruct a person's capacity for self-realisation.
A paper on the critical potential of disorientation (under review)
This paper examines what is required to establish disorientation as a critical category of social experience. I argue that two influential philosophical accounts fail in this task because both model metaphorical disorientation on its literal counterpart, rendering the concept analytically unstable and critically inert. I conclude by reflecting on the conceptual and political stakes of moving beyond such strategies.
A paper on disorientation, anticipation, and social powerlessness (under review)
This paper challenges the assumption that disorientation arises from uncertainty about how to go on, by examining cases in which disorientation emerges from certainty – cases especially common for members of marginalised social groups. I argue that these cases reveal a core phenomenological structure underlying disorientation: a perceived lack of agency over one's personal future that takes a distinctively social form.
A paper on the relation between negative social experiences and social critique
A paper on powerlessness as a central concept for political phenomenology